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It is an established fact that firms, even within narrowly defined industries, differ with respect to
productivity. In this paper we analyse how observed heterogeneity in productivity is affected by
endogenous producer behaviour, and to what extent shifts in firm specific productivity parameters will
affect aggregate industry productivity. We find that endogenous producer behaviour and equilibrium
adjustments may strongly affect observed productivity of firms and aggregate industry productivity.
This makes it problematic to interpret them as structural parameters. The main lesson from the paper
is that identification of such parameters should rely on structural models, in which the equilibrium
determinants of observable productivity for individual firms, the distribution of output shares over
firms, and the number of firms are taken into account. One may otherwise draw very misleading
conclusions about changes in structural parameters from observed productivity variations, either
between firms or for an industry over time.
  Productivity, Heterogeneity, Aggregation
!"#
$
 D24, L11
   Erling Holmøy (corresponding author), Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail:
[erling.holmoy]@ssb.no
                 Torbjørn Hægeland, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail:
torbjorn.haegeland@ssb.no
	
 comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. As a preprint a
Discussion Paper can be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article by in-
cluding intermediate calculation and background material etc.
Abstracts with downloadable PDF files of
Discussion Papers are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb.no
For printed Discussion Papers contact:
Statistics Norway
Sales- and subscription service
N-2225 Kongsvinger
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95
E-mail: Salg-abonnement@ssb.no
3	

Firms differ, even within narrowly defined industries. They differ with respect to size, performance
and productivity. This observation would neither be sensational nor challenging if inter-firm
heterogeneity was modest and temporary. However, there is strong empirical evidence that such
differences are both substantial and persistent, see e.g. Sutton (1997), Baily, Hulten and Campbell
(1992), Klette and Mathiassen (1995, 1996) and Klette (1999).
The evidence of intra-industry productivity differentials raises a number of questions, and we address
two of them in this paper. First, to what extent is observed heterogeneity affected by endogenous
producer behaviour? For example, we examine whether or not differences in exogenous productivity
parameters are magnified or diminished by profit maximisation. The second question is: How, and to
what extent, will shifts in firm specific productivity parameters affect aggregate industry productivity,
defined as an output weighted average over the analogous observable firm productivities? Endogenous
variation in firm productivity, output weights and the number of firms deteriorates the relationship
between micro productivity and aggregate industry productivity.
Obviously, any analysis of these questions calls for a model framework that incorporates productivity
heterogeneity of firms within the same industry. Houthakker (1955-56), Johansen (1959, 1972) and
Salter (1960) represent pioneering work on the correspondence between micro and macro production
functions. However, productivity heterogeneity has typically been ruled out by assumption in popular
models of aggregate industry behaviour in e.g. the "new" literature of international trade and economic
growth, see Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Helpman and Grossman (1992). On the other hand,
heterogeneity in the form of product differentiation has been given considerable attention1. Montagna
(1995) stands out as one exception from the tradition in which aggregate industry behaviour is
explained within the model of (symmetric) monopolistic competition between a large number of firms
with identical technologies.
The analysis in this paper is based on a very simple structure of productivity heterogeneity, described
in Section 2. Still this structure allows us to address the two questions stated above. Our ambition is
that the analysis required for answering these questions also sheds light on more general issues. On the
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 The models of  monopolistic competition do not take the consequences of Chamberlin (1933) and Stigler (1949),
who argued that product differentiation is unlikely to exist without non-uniform costs.
4general level, we hope to increase the consciousness when interpreting observed productivity
variations, either between firms, or for an industry over time. The main lesson from the paper is that
such variations may reflect equilibrium mechanisms rather than changes in "deep" structural
productivity parameters.
Mainly in order to alert the reader’s understanding we present, in Section 3, a rather extreme
illustration of the potential importance of equilibrium mechanisms. Here, the two questions stated
above are analysed within a model where price taking firms use different technologies to produce a
homogenous product. In equilibrium, firms have the same observable productivity, an implication
highly inconsistent with the empirical evidence referred to above. We therefore proceed in Section 4
by analysing the same questions within a richer model, in which products from different firms are
regarded as close but imperfect substitutes. Now, competition among firms is monopolistic, and
endogenous producer behaviour will influence, but not 	
, heterogeneity with respect to
observable productivity.
We derive explicit analytical expressions for the equilibrium elasticities of aggregate productivity with
respect to exogenous shifts in firm specific productivity parameters. These expressions enable us to
identify how equilibrium adjustments of observable firm productivities, output weights and the
number of firms contribute to the change in aggregate productivity. In the differentiated products
model, we find that, if the industry is sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to productivity, the
aggregate productivity response to a uniform productivity shift in all firms is approximately
independent of the degree of market power of firms. Moreover, a high degree of initial productivity
heterogeneity implies that a marginal change in this heterogeneity will only affect aggregate industry
productivity if the firm technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
Compared to the related literature, our model framework has much in common with Montagna (1995).
It differs, however, by imposing more structure on the inter-firm productivity differentials, yielding a
return in terms of analytical tractability. Also, our focus on aggregate productivity differs from the
issues analysed by Montagna. By considering markets where both demand and supply simultaneously
determine equilibrium prices and quantities, our approach also differs drastically from the putty-
clay/vintage model tradition pioneered by Houthakker (1955-56) and Johansen (1972).
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Consider an industry consisting of 
 active firms. The cost function of firm  is
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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where ∈ 
, L is variable costs in firm . L is output, L is a firm-specific cost parameter, 0 1< ≤s
is the scale elasticity and  is a fixed cost. Our productivity measure is variable unit costs
  ≡ . The marginal cost function is ( ) ( )  LLLL λ=′ , where λ = −1 1  is the elasticity of
marginal costs with respect to output. Since the scale elasticity is constant, unit costs are related to
marginal costs by
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For analytical convenience, the set of firms is treated as a continuum. Aggregate productivity is
measured by
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Whereas fixed costs are assumed to be identical for all firms, productivity differentials cause variable
costs to differ between firms. Ranking firms according to productivity, so that firm  is the most
efficient firm, we assume a constant relative productivity differential between any two adjacent firms,
i.e.
(4) 

  L L L
WL
= ⇔ = , ,
where (-) is proportional to the relative productivity differential between firms.  is exogenous.
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In this section we establish a particularly transparent case illustrating how, and to what extent,
	 productivity at both the firm and at the aggregate level is determined by other variables
than the productivity parameter characterising the micro production function, i.e. L above. This case
highlights the problem of identifying productivity shifts at the firm level by looking at aggregate
measures.
Assume that all firms are price takers and produce a homogenous good. Let  be the product price
facing all firms. Firms maximise profits, defined by
(5) πL = L - L(L)V
with respect to L. Using (2), the first order condition can be written
(6) ( )   == .
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The intuition is straightforward: A reduction of L, implies ' ' that output is increased to the
extent that the scale effect on   exactly neutralises the shift in the cost function.
However, micro productivity parameters may affect  and  through the equilibrium price . In
order to explore this possibility within a partial equilibrium framework, we assume that demand is
derived from maximisation of a quasi-linear and separable utility function

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,
7where * and ε are positive parameters,  is utility from consumption of products not produced by the
industry, subject to the budget constraint ,) =+ . The demand for ) becomes )  *ε. In
equilibrium, aggregate output 
Q
L∫= 0  equals demand, i.e.
(7) *ε.
By combining (4) and (6), we see that output is decreasing exponentially in the firm’s position on the
productivity ranking list:
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Define ( )1−−= 
-  where 1≥  is a fixed parameter, which will be interpreted as a ratio between
the output price and marginal costs, i.e. a mark-up factor. In the present model with price taking firms,
=1, and - takes the value λ
- −=’ . Aggregate supply, contingent on 
, can then be written:
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The equilibrium price is found by combining (7) and (9):
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Inserting (10) into (6) yields aggregate productivity:
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A particularly simple case is the one where ∞=ε , so that  is exogenous, cf. Result 1. (11) is the
closed form solution for aggregate productivity when the number of firms is exogenous so that
(1 - -.)-1 >1 is a constant. We will consider the case where 
 is endogenous, determined by the
standard assumption that profits equal fixed costs in the marginal firm, i.e.
(12) πQ = .
Since equilibrium profits are decreasing monotonically in , the solution for 
 is unique. In the
appendix we derive the following:
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Observe that the first (positive) terms on the right hand side of (13) and (14) equal the corresponding
partial elasticities in the case where 
 is fixed. The intuition behind these terms is analogous to
familiar incidence analysis in partial equilibrium models. Consider first (13). If output, hypothetically,
is held constant, raising  by one percent implies a one percent increase in  . However, the positive
shift in the individual marginal cost functions implies a negative shift in the aggregate supply curve. In
the new equilibrium,  is higher and output lower compared to the initial equilibrium. All firms reduce
their output, and decreasing returns to scale (λ > 0) cause a negative feedback on marginal costs in all
firms. In equilibrium, the contribution to the change rate of 0  from the reduction of  caused by a 1
percent increase in , equals -ελ/(1 + ελ). Adding the 1 percent direct shift in the cost function yields
9the first term on the right hand side of (13). The incidence from  to  and   is stronger the less
elastic is demand, and the closer is to unity.
The intuition behind the first term on the right hand side of (14) may be explained as follows: The
increase in  raises costs in all firms except firm . Their output reduction is larger the closer  is to
unity, but is modified by the upward equilibrium adjustment of . Finally, the effect on  is modified
by the increased output of firm . The net effect on price and unit costs is decreasing in ε, and
increasing in .
The second term on the right hand side of (13) and (14) captures the effects of changes in 
 on  .
When ε=1, there will be no changes in 
 and the solution for 
ˆ
 degenerates to  =
=1
ˆ
ε
. The
reason why 
 remains constant in this case may easily be explained from the profit expression for the
marginal firm /
 the change in . Using the first order condition, profits equal ( )
QQ
−= 1π .
With unitary price elasticity, the product Q will stay constant since the relative output adjustments
are identical in all existing firms.
Inspection of (13) reveals that the equilibrium changes in 
 implies a positive (negative) contribution
to 
ˆ
 when ε>1 (ε<1)2. When ε>1, ( )
QQ
−= 1π  falls and firms exit. Exit of firms implies, '
', another negative shift in the aggregate supply curve.  will rise further to clear the market, which
makes it profitable for the remaining firms to expand their output along their increasing marginal cost
curves. This output effect explains why 
ˆ
 is higher (lower) when ε>1 (ε<1). This result may appear
somewhat paradoxical in the present context of heterogeneous firms, since the additional positive
impact on 
ˆ
 is associated with exit of the 	 productive firms. As demonstrated, however, changes
in productivity follows  in this model. What matters for the changes in , is that entry or exit of firms
shifts the aggregate supply function. Compared to a model of identical firms, the (model) fact that
marginal firms will have a smaller output share than intra-marginal firms, reduces the effect on 
caused by entry or exit.
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Turning to the effect of changes in 
 on 
ˆ
, (14) shows that this influence is negative. As shown in the
appendix, the rise in  brings about a decrease in -., and inspection of (11) shows that  is increasing
in -.. This can be seen from (9). Reducing -. implies, '', a positive shift in aggregate supply,
which forces , and thereby  , down. Why does -. fall when  rises? From the definition of -.,
0’ˆ <-  implies that 1ˆ −>W
 . If, hypothetically, 1ˆ −=W
 , -. would have been constant, and profits in
the / marginal firm would balance the fixed cost for the /
 equilibrium price. But  goes up
for a given -. due to the contraction of supplies from all remaining firms but the most efficient one.
The increase in  raises profits, and explains why 1ˆ −>
W

 .
It follows that when an industry becomes more heterogeneous, measured by an increase in 
, -. tends
to zero. Consequently, when 
 is large,  can be approximated by neglecting the factor 1/(1--.) in
(12). The corresponding approximate elasticities are equal to the first term on the right hand side of
(13) and (14). Technically, this approximation is obtained by including all firms instead of only the 

most productive when calculating aggregate variables. The error resulting from including the firms
with profits less than , is small when the output share of these firms are small.
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In the model with homogeneous products in the previous section, productivity heterogeneity is
eliminated because firms adjust their output to the level where marginal costs equal a common output
price. This result contrasts the empirical findings of large and persistent within-industry productivity
differentials, which indicates that productivity heterogeneity is also an equilibrium phenomenon. This
motivates a richer model specification. In this section we relax the assumption of a homogenous
industry product, and consider the case where firms produce different varieties of a product. A
convenient framework is the popular "large group case" model of monopolistic competition (LGMC).
Below we extend this model by allowing firms to differ in productivity.

The demand for the industry product is derived from the quasi-linear utility function introduced in the
previous section. However, ) is now the utility from consuming a composite of the different varieties.
Following the standard approach in models of monopolistic competition, the sub-utility function
associated with ) takes the symmetric CES-form (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977):
11
(15) ( )[ ] σσ 11 10 11 −−∫= ) Q L ,
where σ >1 is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties. We assume that σ>ε. Let 
L
  denote
the price of variety  and , the given total expenditure. Demand functions for all varieties are derived
from utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint ∫ =+Q LL ,0 . Equilibrium in each
variety market requires
(16) ε
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where  is the price index for the composite industry product.  is the minimum cost of obtaining one
unit of the composite industry product. The CES form of ) implies
(17) ( ) ( )σσ −− = ∫
11
0
1Q
L
 .
Firms maximise profits, defined by (5), with respect to 
L
 . Although the market share will differ
between firms, we stick to the standard LGMC assumption that each firm neglects the influence of its
own price on the price index . Thus, the perceived own price elasticity facing all firms equals -σ.
Optimal price setting gives the familiar mark-up rule
(18) ( )λ
L
L
L
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 = ,
where ( )m = −σ σ 1  is the mark-up factor. The equations (4), (5), (14), (15) and (16) determine L, πL,
L,  and L. As shown in detail in Holmøy and Hægeland (1997), the model can be written
(19a)
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(19b)
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The second equality in (17a) follows from ( )m = −σ σ 1 . In order to calculate  =  we need
expressions for aggregate output and costs. Given 
, we have
(22) ( )P-


 −

 −
= 11 0 .
(23) ( ) ( )-


 V −

 −
= 11 10 .
Dividing (23) by (21) yields aggregate unit costs
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where ( )λ00  =  is unit costs in the most efficient firm, and
(25) ( ) ( )( )1
1
1
1
1
1
−−
−−
−
−
=
−
−
=
VPPQW
VPQW
P 

-
-

! .
13

 
So far, the solution for  has been contingent on 
. Rather than considering a market structure with a
fixed number of firms, 
 may be determined through entry or exit according to (12). Before
considering  in the free entry case, we analyse how 
 affects productivity in more detail.
(24) shows that the influence of 
 on   can be decomposed into changes in the multiplier !0
1 and
changes in 0 . Moreover, the ratio of   to 0  equals !(
). This ratio may be interpreted as a
measure of the scope for entry and exit to generate aggregate scale diseconomies. We now show that
variations in 
 will have only limited influence on  / 0 . To see this, note that !(
) is strictly
increasing and concave in 
, ( ) 
!
QW
1lim 0 =→ , ( ) ∞=′→ 
!QW 0lim , ( ) 1lim =∞→ 
!QW , and
( ) 0lim =′
∞→ 
!QW . The latter property implies that !(
) converges fast towards unity when 

increases from 0 into the range where 
 is large enough to make the LGMC model appropriate. (24)
and the properties of the !(
) function, implies the following sharp and general conclusion about the
scope for heterogeneity to cause   to deviate from 0 :
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Note that the mark-up factor itself is not a primary determinant of  . However, under the price
setting assumptions in the LGMC model, it compactly summarises the effects on  / 0  caused by
equilibrium adjustments of demand to price differentials between varieties. The shape of the !(
)
function allows an even sharper conclusion:
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Consequently, when the LGMC model is relevant, endogenous mechanisms cause 0 to be a good
approximation of average productivity. Relative 
! in aggregate productivity will be
approximately equal to relative changes in 0 .
The non-trivial statement in (26) is of course the existence of an upper asymptotic bound for  even
entering firms are successively less productive. The principal reason for this result is that 
L
  is
decreasing in , which causes the integral defining  to converge when 
 approaches infinity. When 

grows beyond all limits,  / 0  is determined by the ratio between the growth rate of L and the
growth rate of L with respect to . The growth rate of L equals -σ/(1+σλ)= -/(/-1), and the
growth rate of L equals  - σ/[(1 + σλ)] = -/(/3%1. The ratio between these growth rates equals .
With constant returns to scale at the firm level, 0 = . In this case, not only the range of potential
variation in  / 0  is limited - also the range of potential variation in the 		 of   is limited. This
case is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, n* is the equilibrium number of firms in the case when the LGMC
model is relevant.
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With decreasing returns to scale at the firm level, 0  depends on 
 through modifications in . An
increase in 
 raises (1- -), which reduces  and 0 . The intuition behind this effect is associated
with the valuation of variety inherent in the utility function, which shows up as a decline in  when 

increases3. Such a fall in  implies two effects on . First, the demand for all varieties of the
differentiated product increases. Second, demand is redirected from the pre-existing varieties to the
varieties produced by the new marginal firms. Since σ > ε, the latter "internal" substitution effect
dominates.
Consequently, the two effects on   induced by increasing 
 pull in opposite directions; !(
) rises
whereas 0  falls. In Figure 1 these opposing effects can be illustrated by a simultaneous downward
shift of the  -curve, and a movement to the right along the shifted  -curve. In the appendix, we
derive the premises for the following result:
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( )[ ] ( ) 11110 ≤+−+≡< ελελ '
 captures the negative scale effect on unit costs within pre-existing firms due to redistribution of
demand from pre-existing to less productive entrants. From the properties of the g(
) function, it can
be shown that 
1
!ˆ = -P/(1--P) - -/(1--) < 0. However, since < 1, the sign of the bracketed term,
and thereby the sign of 

ˆ
, is ambiguous.
It follows that if firm technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, an exogenous expansion of
industry output through entry of firms implies aggregate decreasing returns to scale. This conclusion
may, however, be reversed if there is a strong degree of decreasing returns to scale within each firm.
The positive contribution to aggregate productivity from redistributing the most costly units of output
from pre-existing firms to entrants, may then be large enough to dominate the negative contribution
caused by the lower overall efficiency of these entrants.
!   
We now consider exogenous changes in  and , in the situation where 
 is determined by the
entry/exit condition (12). In the appendix we derive the following result:
#	
(		 # 
ˆ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3
 Compared to the standard symmetric LGMC model, the love of variety effect of 
 on  is somewhat modified in our
asymmetric model. But although the index  includes higher prices as 
 grows, the valuation of increased variety still causes
 to be negatively related to 
.
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The first term on the right hand side of (28) is equal to ˆ  when 
 is constant, 



ˆ
. Observe that



ˆ
 is identical to the corresponding partial elasticity in the homogeneous good model, which was
analysed in Section 3. The intuition behind this particular elasticity is also the same in the two models.
In both models, and for the same reason, 
 is invariant with respect to  when ε = 1. Thus,


 
ˆˆ
= when ε = 1. Even when 1≠ε , 



ˆ
 may serve as a good approximation to the exact
elasticity, when the degree of heterogeneity is strong, i.e. when 
 is large so that - is small.
In the second term in (28), which accounts for the influence of equilibrium adjustments in 
, we know
that [1+8-/(1--)]-1 > 0. However, the sign of the bracketed term, which equals 
1
ˆ , is ambiguous as
shown in the explanation of (27). In the special case where λ = 0, there is no feedback on ( )0  from
0, and =1. Therefore, when ε > 1 (ε < 1), the contribution to ˆ  from changes in 
 is negative
(positive). When ε > 1, the logic goes as follows: The rise in  reduces profits in the /
 marginal
firm, πQ, and cause exit of the least efficient firms.  increases when 
 goes down and this triggers
substitution of demand within the industry in favour of the more efficient ones, which accounts for the
positive productivity effect.
When λ > 0, it is not necessarily true that exit (entry) of firms has a positive (negative) impact on
aggregate productivity. The reason is that the most efficient and profitable firms may produce at a
scale that makes their marginal costs higher than in the less efficient firms. Thus, when output
previously produced by the least efficient firms are reallocated to the most efficient ones, aggregate
unit costs may rise.
We now turn to the equilibrium solution for the aggregate productivity effect induced by a change in .
In the appendix we derive:
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The first term in (29) accounts for the relative impact on   caused by a 1 percent increase in 
contingent on - being constant, 
-

ˆ
. The reason why 0ˆ >
-
  is that a rise in  induces an increase
in the marginal costs and prices of all but the most efficient firm. The resulting increase in  implies a
reduction of the demand for the differentiated product, as well as an internal substitution of demand in
favour of the most efficient firm. As noted above, the latter effect dominates since σ > ε.
Consequently,  goes up, which raises   when λ > 0. Again, 
-

ˆ
 will be a better approximation to

ˆ
 the stronger is the initial degree of heterogeneity measured by 
.
The last term in (29) accounts for the contribution to ˆ  from changes in -, which are due to both the
exogenous change in  as well as the endogenous adjustment of 
. As pointed out above, the sign of
the bracketed term, which equals 
1
ˆ , was found to be indeterminate. The last parenthesis, which is
positive, equals - ( )
W

ˆ1+ . ( )
W

ˆ1+  is equal to the equilibrium change rate of 
 when 1ˆ =  (percent). In
the appendix, equation (A19), we show that 0ˆ1 >+
W

 , which implies that the equilibrium value of
WQ
Q
 = is higher after the increase in  than prior to the shift. Thus, while we can not say whether the
industry equilibrium / the increase in  includes more or fewer firms compared to the /

equilibrium, it is unambiguously true that the /industry equilibrium includes active firms with
lower observable productivity compared to the initial equilibrium.
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In the special case when λ = 0, there is no contribution to ˆ  from scale effects at the firm level. Then
the first term in (29) vanishes. Moreover,  = 1 so 
1
ˆ  in the brackets becomes negative, which
confirms that 

ˆ > 0 when λ = 0. We can therefore conclude
%	
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The content of Result 8 can be explained intuitively as follows: The rise in  raises unit and marginal
costs in all but the most efficient firm. Computing the new value of   with the initial output shares
and the initial number of firms will produce a higher aggregate unit cost. It turns out that this positive
contribution to the equilibrium value of 
ˆ
 is the dominating one. There will, however, be two kinds
of modifications. First, as shown in (A22) and (A23) in the appendix, the output shares will change in
favour of the most efficient firm. Second, the number of firms may go down through exit of the least
efficient firms. However, since 0ˆ1 >+
W

 , this effect is not strong enough to generate a reduction in 
.
%&

In this paper we have analysed the questions: i) to what extent is observed heterogeneity in
productivity affected by endogenous producer behaviour?  ii) How, and to what extent, do shifts in
firm specific productivity parameters affect aggregate industry productivity? Within market models
based on perfect and monopolistic competition, the analysis has taken into account the endogeneity of
observable productivity of individual firms, the output shares of firms used to compute average
industry productivity, and the number of firms. Based on analytical expressions for the equilibrium
elasticities of aggregate industry productivity with respect to firm specific productivity parameters, we
have derived 8 specific results that are relevant when attempting to answer the two questions stated
above.
A very transparent and extreme illustration of the potential importance of equilibrium adjustments in
the determination of observable productivity is obtained in the model assuming perfect competition.
Here firms, using different technologies to produce a homogenous product, end up with the same
	 productivity level as long as their elasticity of scale is common and constant. This result
contrasts massive empirical evidence, and motivates richer models, where productivity heterogeneity
remains as an equilibrium phenomenon. We show that the model based on monopolistic competition
20
may be qualitatively consistent with data, but the quantitative fitness remains to be checked. When
trying to estimate "deep" structural parameters characterising the market structure and productivity
heterogeneity for a specific industry, one will probably have to relax several of the simplifying
assumptions made in this paper. However, such research should take into account the main lesson
from this paper: Identification of such parameters should rely on structural models,  which account for
the equilibrium determinants of observable productivity for individual firms, the distribution of output
shares over firms, and the number of firms. Our paper shows that one may otherwise draw very
misleading conclusions about changes in "deep" structural parameters from observed productivity
variations, either between firms or for an industry over time.
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Profits in the marginal firm equal
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Inserting (10) into (A1.1) yields
(A2) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )ελλλλ λ
π
++




−



−=
1111
’1
’1
-
*


-
Q
From the equilibrium condition
(12) πQ = ,
we obtain the following implicit solution for -.:
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Let ’’’ˆ --- =  and similarly for the relative change of other variables. From the definition of -. we
have
(A4) ( )
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Logarithmic differentiation of (A3) gives
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Combining (A4) and (A5) yields
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when all variables but  and  are constant. Logarithmic differentiation of (11) with respect to ,  and
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Inserting (A4), (A6) and finally (A7) yields
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Substituting the expression for 9ˆ  implies
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where 
ˆ
 and 
ˆ
 are the partial elasticities of   with respect to  and  respectively. In the special
case where ε = 1, the elasticities simplifies to
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By deriving the analytical solution for the partial elasticity of   with respect to 
, we can verify that
the net effect of a partial increase in 
 on  is theoretically ambiguous. To this end, we need the
elasticities of !(
) with respect to 
and ,
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The positive sign of 
WQ
!! ˆˆ =  follows from the fact that 0ˆ <-  and -P/(1--P) - -/(1--) <0. The sign
of the latter term follows from the properties of the function !(
), cf. Holmøy (1999). Utilising (19b),
(21) and (25), logarithmic differentiation of (24) with respect to 
 implies
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The bracketed term in (A13) equals the elasticity of   with respect to -, i.e. 
1
ˆ . Since -P/(1--P) -
-/(1--) < 0, 
1
ˆ <0 if  were equal to unity. However, since 1≤ , the sign of 
1
ˆ  is ambiguous.
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Logarithmic differentiation of (24) implies
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The partial logarithmic derivatives of  are given by
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8 >0, which is the elasticity of  with respect to  when
the variation in - is neglected. That 0ˆ 0 >W  follows from ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 0111ˆ1ˆ1 >−+−=−+ ------ .
To prove the latter result, consider the numerator ( ) ( ) ( ) 11ˆ11ˆˆ ˆ +−=+−= 1----ϕ  defined for
0ˆ <- . It is straightforward to verify that ( ) 0ˆ <′ -ϕ , that ( ) 1ˆlim
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ϕ  and that ( ) 00 =ϕ . Thus,
( ) 1ˆ0 << -ϕ , which implies that ( ) ( ) ( ) 01ˆ1ˆ1 ˆ >−=−+ 1---- ϕ .
In order to derive 
F

ˆ  and 
W

ˆ , we use the entry/exit equilibrium condition ( ) 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=,,π . Logarithmic
differentiation implies
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Rewriting the profit function as ( ) -

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 V
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1
01,, 


−=π , recognising (A15), (A16) and (A17) as
well as the definition of -, the partial elasticities of πQ(n) becomes
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We then obtain
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Inserting (A12) and (A15) - (A19) into (A14) yields the following solution for ˆ :
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where the last expression was obtained by using the definition of 0< ( )[ ] ( ) 1111 ≤+−+≡ ελελ
introduced above.
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The solution for 
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 can then be written
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Cost increments are transmitted to output prices and to the price index . The increase in  reduces
demand for the differentiated industry product. At the same time, the increased cost and price
heterogeneity also induces substitution of demand within the industry in favour of the most efficient
firm. For the most efficient firm the latter substitution effect dominates, so the output from the most
efficient firm will increase. On the other hand, output from the / marginal firm goes down. The
equilibrium relative change will be
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Recall, however, that output changes at the firm level have no cost effect when λ=0. On the other
hand, when λ > 0, so that 0 < < 1, the redirection of output within the industry implies a positive
contribution to 
ˆ
 from scale effects at the individual firm level. In this case changes in -  have a
negative impact on 
ˆ
. However, when λ>0 the term in (A21) becomes positive, and will dominate
effects caused by changes in - as long as the market share of the least efficient firm is sufficiently
small.
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